Mass Evacuation: FDNY Firefighter Perspective

On March 10, 2004, Fire Department Dispatchers for the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) were alerted to an out-of-control Long Island Rail Road locomotive roaring toward several crossings near the Queens-Brooklyn border of New York City. Within this residential/industrial section of the city, hundreds of chemicals are developed and transported each year. Citizens and officials are concerned about accidents and acts of terrorism happening within this community. Ninety-three percent of more than 3,100 localities completing a FEMA questionnaire identified one or more hazardous material risks as a significant threat to their community.

According to one study, nearly 300 evacuations – due to chemical releases alone – took place during a five-year period. As the runaway locomotive plowed through automobiles, it left behind a path of destruction and burning debris. The locomotive concluded its run by striking two trucks owned by the New York and Atlantic Railway a few blocks away, sparking a major fire near tanks containing acetylene and oxygen. Ultimately, firefighters arrived on the scene and prevented an even worse calamity. The firefighters also conducted an evacuation of the area.

In order to prevent mass casualties, the FDNY is often involved in mass evacuations of civilians from dangerous zones. While the NYPD and occasionally military personnel are involved in evacuations, it is the fire department usually providing expertise and direction. Fires in occupied buildings frequently require removal of the occupants. In addition to building evacuations, firefighters are often involved in the removal of people from entire city blocks – and on September 11, 2001, the island of Manhattan itself. Because of the risk of hazardous material incidents like the runaway locomotive, as well as the reality of living in a post 9/11 world, communities must maintain a constant state of preparedness. A key to preparedness is having an emergency evacuation plan.

A report prepared by FEMA on 242 evacuations in cities across the US shows that communities rely upon evacuations as a primary means of protecting their citizens.

However, the majority of evacuations cited were conducted on an ad hoc basis without a viable emergency operations plan (EOP). Each jurisdiction should not only have an all-hazard EOP, but also a complete and sound evacuation plan.

Much of the following information is from FEMA’s “Fire Officer’s Guide to Disaster Control” and the National Fire Academy’s “Disaster and Fire Defense Planning.” The National Response Team (NRT) produced the “Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide”, a product of the cooperative efforts of the 14 federal agencies that constitute the NRT. The author cites below the section of the NRT guide that corresponds to a functional annex on evacuation; it is not a model but a guide to the topics that should be covered.

Recommended Evacuation Procedures

• Title of person and alternate(s) who can order an evacuation
• Vulnerable zones where evacuation could be necessary and a method for notifying persons in these places
• Provisions for a precautionary evacuation
• Methods for controlling traffic flow and providing alternate traffic routes
• Shelter locations and other provisions for evacuation, for example hospitals with special needs
• Agreements with nearby jurisdictions to receive evacuees
• Agreements with hospitals outside the local jurisdictions
• Protective shelter for relocated populations
• Reception and care of evacuees
• Re-entry procedures

The Entire Community Must Be Involved

Evacuation will be the most sweeping response to Weapons of Mass Destruction.
The plan should clearly identify under what circumstances evacuation would be appropriate and necessary. Department of Transportation’s Emergency Response Guidebook provides suggested distances for evacuating unprotected people from the scene of a chemical release incident during the initial phase. It is important to distinguish between general evacuation of the entire area and selective evacuation of a part of the risk zone.

In either case, the plan should identify how people will be moved. On September 11, as well as the case of the runaway locomotive, the fire department operations center made provisions for quickly moving traffic out of the risk zone and also for preventing outside traffic from entering the risk zone. Additionally, schools were located in the risk zone, and predetermined locations received students and offered parents a place to communicate with their children. Moreover, special attention was paid to evacuating hospitals, nursing homes, and homes for the mentally disabled. Regarding the runaway locomotive, as a direct result of lessons learned from 9/11, considerations of when and how evacuees would be able to return to their homes were incorporated in the annex. Furthermore, the evacuation annex also included a description of how the fire department and police department would coordinate with the medical community. Copies of the evacuation procedure were provided to all appropriate agencies and organizations, including the American Red Cross and Salvation Army. The procedure was also published in the local newspapers.

FDNY Key Considerations in Large-Scale Evacuations
Items to be considered by the fire department incident commander when actually evacuating will surface by answering the questions: Why, who, how, how long, where to, and how much? Answers to these questions will determine what goes into the plan and what is important in the onscene decision-making process.

Why Evacuate?

• How much material is left to explode, spread as a gas, etc?
• What are the odds for an expansion?
• What are the possibilities of inplace shelter?
• How can weather affect the outcome?
• What are the estimates of warning time if the event worsens?
• What are the effects of a worst case situation compared with the adverse effects of an evacuation?
• What is the estimated time to evacuate compared with the time available in a worst case development?

Who Is Evacuated?
The area to be evacuated may include the area of potential danger due to drifting gases, radioactivity, or subsequent explosions, as well as the area of actual damage. If people can make their homes reasonably airtight, are they safer at home from poisonous gases or radiation than they are with the risks of an evacuation?

Who Orders Evacuation?
This is a matter of planning. In smallscale emergencies the first responder, first onscene fire chief, or whoever specified by the Department SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) should have authority to evacuate exposed buildings or the immediate area. The plan must designate the person or persons with authority to order largescale evacuations.

How?

• Structure-mounted sirens where the public is trained to turn on the radio upon hearing the proper warning signal
• Radio and TV announcements – for example the emergency broadcasting system
• Phone, word of mouth
• Mobile loudspeakers from vehicles traveling up and down blocks
• Door to door

How Long?
If evacuation time is the total time from the onset of the incident until everyone has cleared the area, then it is the sum of the following:

• Time delay after occurrence until the evacuation order
• Time required to notify the population
• Time required for people to mobilize and get underway
• Time required to leave the affected area

Re-entry
The longer the evacuation lasts, the more tension builds among the evacuees. Keeping the area sealed off becomes a growing police problem, especially if no danger is perceived. The author’s personal experience with re-entry is that people have many reasons for re-entry, from getting their medicine to feeding their pets left behind.

Where To?
Shelters should be selected because they are far enough away to eliminate any chance of secondary evacuation. In WMD and hazmat incidents, wind direction is almost always a factor. Excellent resources are the Red Cross and Salvation Army, because they have experience running shelters. Of significance, people are registered, even if they don’t remain.

How Much?
There is very little data on the detailed costs of past evacuations. Total ballpark figures for an accident are sometimes stated, but a breakdown into component costs such as evacuation is not. Even if all the data could be collected on a specific past event, its applicability to a future event may be marginal. Moreover, cost of evacuation is not considered when danger to life is obvious.

When we deal with disasters, we invariably deal with large numbers of people. Disasters can overwhelm the fire service if planning and preparation are not made in advance to handle both the large number of casualties and the large numbers of persons who must be removed from the area. The information and guidelines presented in this article can well mean the difference between order and chaos when a community is suddenly struck with a calamity affecting large numbers of its population.